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oAbstract
This paper focuses on the climate change challenge faced by Central & Eastern
European countries both those inside the European Union and those outside it. They
have enormous energy intensity and associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
mainly from energy production, which is oil, and worse, coal-fired power stations. As
a group of blocs, CEE is a significant actor on the global climate change canvas. Their
actions can make a difference. But there are numerous regulatory constraints that
make this currently difficult. With the onset of a new global regime consequent on
the renegotiation of acceptable levels of GHG emissions at Bali in 2007, to be ratified
in Copenhagen in 2009, all countries with levels such a those in CEE will have to
reduce emissions significantly as will countries throughout the world, especially the
‘big burners’ like USA and China. With some data and textured case illustrations the
article points the way to mitigation of emissions by learning from Denmark, the
world leader as a ‘green economy’ and Wales, part of the UK which has a long
established heavy industry tradition comparable to many CEE countries and where
positive change is underway from unlikely sources.
JEL: A14; O33; R11; R58
Keywords: Green governance; Green innovation; Green clusters; Renewable energy;
Wind turbines; Solar thermal energy; BiofuelsBackground
This contribution involves reflecting on the variety of governance and policy responses
by cities to climate change. Climate change refers to the historically measurable in-
creasing rate of atmospheric ‘greenhouse gases’, particularly carbon dioxide (CO2).
While there is debate about the causes of climate change, there is consensus that
human activity has made a contribution to it since the onset of industrialisation and
especially in the very recent past (Bastianoni et al. 2004). The future contribution of
cities to mitigating climate change will concentrate upon the four key content areas
that research has shown to be main contributors to increased CO2 and other green-
house gases, all of which are connected to urban governance. These are food consump-
tion, passenger transport, energy use and municipal waste. Following one of the
numerous Stockholm Environment Institute’s reports (Stockholm Environment Insti-
tute 2005) consumption of food accounts for some 24 % of emissions making up a2015 Cooke. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
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ute 18 % while municipal waste accounts for 26 %. The remainder is accounted for by
such activities as housing, government and services.
How should cities begin the process of moderating these emissions? They must first
know their emissions profile and identify which are badly out of line with acceptable
norms. Ecological footprint assessments constitute a credible entry point to the forma-
tion by a city (or county) of a strategy to take actions that reduce emissions. In the case
of food consumption, it can take direct action to utilise, and even grow, less energy
intensive organic food and/or use localised food chains to supply canteens for which it
may have sole responsibility (e.g. schools, care homes, administration) as well as
animating similar approaches in other public (e.g. hospitals, higher education), private
and domestic food consumption environments such as any local food and/or health
alliance (Alliance 2004). Regarding passenger transport, city governance may involve
using renewable fuels in public bus and delivery fleets, encouraging greater public
transport use, using planning policy to limit sprawl and traffic while providing cycleways,
green space and downtown housing accommodation. With respect to other energy utilisa-
tion, cities can change their purchased energy consumption to renewable sources and
install biomass or other clean energy technologies where they generate their own. This
connects to the area of municipal waste, which through adoption of waste recycling, can
supply biomass for energy production. For energy waste itself, energy-saving initiatives
can be taken directly on city-owned buildings, street-lighting, traffic lights, other heating
and lighting and nurseries, also indirectly by encouraging energy saving among citizens.
Research must explore all these and more aspects of city governance in the context
of climate change, seeking to explain why some are pioneers, early adopters and com-
mitted implementers of actions responsive to the widely-perceived need for reductions
in greenhouse gases, and why some are latecomers or uncommitted to taking such
actions directly or indirectly.
The relevance of supranational, national and sub-national regulation, such as the Rio,
Kyoto framing and Montreal (Kunstler 2005) binding climate change protocols; the EU
European Climate Change Programme and EU Emissions Trading Scheme; national
energy and climate change strategies; and relevant sub-national initiatives should be taken
into account. In the third section, this contribution will proceed with the elaboration of a
matrix of the spectrum of city take-up qualities from city leadership to apparent city
apathy on the x-axis, against governance relations on the y-axis (on mayors good and bad,
see (Lever 2001)). The latter spectrum will include categories capturing political compos-
ition (hypothesising, for example, that Green political representation or sympathies exert
leadership and commitment), officer influence (e.g. including multi-level governance and
strategy expertise), transnational sustainability networks (e.g. EU Sustainable Cities
Network), associative governance (active climate-change lobbying by civic societies),
knowledgeable governance (e.g. interfaces between city policy and specialist research or
advocacy institutions), business context (local presence of, for example, ‘cleantech’ busi-
ness, influential and demanding ‘green’ corporate citizens ((Freeman et al. 1996; Gibbs
et al. 2002), who associate local sustainability policy with ‘good governance’). The discov-
ery of combinations or multiple absences of such relational factors in association with
leadership and measurable commitment will also be taken into account and efforts made
to find other explanations for both non-relational commitment and relational apathy in
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contrariwise, a ‘pro-growth’ city regime may exercise ‘good governance’ that is not good
for limiting greenhouse emissions. Thus there is an ethical hierarchy to be teased out con-
ceptually and empirically. In this, there is an implication that the exigencies of moderating
climate change are superior to those of promoting ‘good business climates’ (Stern 2007).
Naturally, research needs to be informed by and conducted against benchmarks or at
least templates of known good practice exemplars. Here, these will be drawn from two
Scandinavian cities of different sizes, both with strong international reputations for
demonstrable commitment and achieved outcomes in some or all of the content areas
noted above. The cities are Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmö, Sweden. Briefly, both
tackled the first content area – agro-food - by transforming food procurement from
conventional to organic, Copenhagen including schools, hospitals, day care and long-
term care homes, Malmö mainly schools. Together, these city strategies on organic
canteen food alone contributed to a 2.25 % reduction in CO2 emissions from their
institutional food chains. In the second content area, Malmö’s municipal car fleet has,
in 2007, 150 of a planned 250 ‘cleantech’ vehicles, passenger transport CO2 emissions
have reduced by 10-15 % in Copenhagen 1996–2006 following establishment of urban
environmental zones and clean technology measures. With respect to content area four,
in Copenhagen up to 80 % of city household waste is used in Energy from Waste
(EfW) power plants while over 70 % of all waste is recycled. Regarding energy, the third
content area, more than 25 % of electricity generation in Copenhagen is from renew-
ables, notably wind (4 %) and solar power (3 %) in addition to waste (26 %). Malmö has
approved building of a biogas from waste biofuels plant. Copenhagen had, from 1990
to 2005 reduced overall CO2emissions by 23 %. It is planned to reduce by 35 % 1990–
2010. These achievements led to Copenhagen being elected Environmental Capital of
Europe and International Solar City. In its latest Agenda 21 Plan Copenhagen’s own
energy consumption is planned to be reduced by 5 % 2002–2007 Copenhagen Environ-
mental Protection (Agency 2006; City of Malmö Environment Department 2006).
The research objectives of this chapter and its content are, accordingly, as follows.
First, it outlines ways to determine theoretically reasons for variety in the extent of
commitment by cities to policy agendas prioritising measures designed to minimise
emissions believed to be significant contributors to climate change. Second, it suggests
ways to develop better urban governance theory through contributing new comparative
conceptual and some limited empirical material on interpreting substantive policy
rationales that cities may pursue, such as pro-growth versus pro-green, and possible
resolutions of apparent conflicts. Third, it addresses ways to evolve a typological frame-
work for categorising cities according to ‘sustainability performance’ on the x-axis and
their ‘governance mode’ on the y-axis (Fig. 1). Fourth it indicates how to test the
typology in Fig. 1 utilising the four key performance variables identified for all cities as
controlling emissions from: food consumption; passenger transport; energy use; and
municipal waste, against three governance modes: inclusive governance/responsive
government; responsive governance/proactive government; exclusive government/react-
ive governance. Finally, it hints at ways to derive a governance/government taxonomy
of cities according to the extent they interact measurably with any of six governance
contexts: political composition, officer influence, transnational sustainability networks,






























Fig. 1 Governance-performance typology framework for city sustainability
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Given the rising popular concern and mounting evidence of climate change due at least
in some measure to the increase in greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous
oxide, and methane (Stern 2007), it is perhaps surprising that urban governance
research has produced few studies of the policy achievements of cities for controlling
emissions that contribute to global warming. The exemplar discussed in the introduc-
tion, Copenhagen, has no such research reported and the reported data had to be ex-
tensively data-mined, also for Malmö. One conference paper only, written by engineers,
could be found dealing with the larger city’s Dogma institutional food and environment
project, for example (Jensen & Tollin 2004). The key point regarding governments, and
cities particularly in this context, is that they are the main variant to markets as stimu-
lators of change. While markets clearly exist for certain clean technologies, notably
wind energy; in Denmark, a leading producer of wind turbines, the technology was sub-
sidised from the 1970s until 2000, much as the US government currently heavily subsi-
dises biofuels and clean technology. Clearly cities are not immune from markets, but they
can exert a market-shaping pressure through regulation and purchasing.
In researching this contribution, we found a mid-size British city like Bristol (popula-
tion 500,000) having installed low-energy street lighting, built a biomass heating system
for its horticultural recquirements, and purchasing renewable energy (‘green electricity’)
for a dozen major council-owned facilities, including a concert hall. In addition it pro-
motes green practices among its citizens through a variety of initiatives. Finally, Bristol
has reached the appropriate standard to be included as a ‘Transition Town’ in an initia-
tive promoted by the UK’s Soil Association. The Soil Association is the private regula-
tory body responsible for officially designating farms and food as ‘organic’. In the
Transition Towns initiative, the Soil Association advises and certifies towns (and now
cities) that achieve an appropriate ‘green’ designation. The coordinator of the Transi-
tion Town movement, Rob Hopkins, of Plymouth University, helped create the earliest
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advises the many others that have signed up.
Moving to theoretical analysis, the study of urban politics evolved towards a popular
focus upon urban governance in the 1990s (Stoker 1999) it engaged with older regime the-
ory (e.g. (Elkin 1986)) and particularly urban regime theory (Stone 1989; Stone 1993;
Stoker & Mossberger 1994). Urban regime theory was based on a critique of the pluralist
theory of democracy of the early 1960s (Dahl 1961) and aligned with an élite theory ap-
proach associated with Dahl’s erstwhile collaborator Charles Lindblom (Lindblom 1977).
In this, it was argued that in market societies governments require economic growth to
achieve political aims, a factor that places inordinate political power in the hands of busi-
ness leaders. Regime theory accepts this and studies the manner in which the division of
labour between business and governance actually functions, especially at the interface.
Stone (Stone 1989) conceives of the regime as the medium in the relationship between
politics and economy. Thus there is always, it is argued, some governance necessary for
government to engage in actual governing. There have been a number of critiques of urban
regime theory, the most serious of which is that it seldom addresses or examines the eco-
nomic side of the equation. A second critique is that it excludes any room for political
agency and variety in policy inputs and outcomes. Finally, due to its structural over-
determination it is unable to explain how the regime evolves or, normatively, how it might
be changed (Ward 1996; Davies 2002).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, regime theory is nowadays commonly championed by leftwards
leaning urban theorists, tending to inhabit a post-marxist ‘regulation school’ niche
(Broomhill 2001). Nevertheless, and despite the critques discussed, the more subtle of
these analysts have sought to overcome the economic determinism that urban regime the-
ory introduced. A productive research group addressing UK urban sustainability govern-
ance of relevance to the present proposal adopts both the regulationist and urban regime
theory mantles (Gibbs et al., 2000; Gibbs et al. 2002; While et al. 2004). Their position
and findings are as follows. Arguing against a fundamentalist perspective that saw eco-
nomic globalization facing urban governance with mounting pressure on protected open
space, regulatory dumping, increased levels of consumption, negative environmental
externalities, and increased material flows into and through the built environment, often
at the expense of poorer residents and communities, they have sought to uncover evi-
dence that environmentalism is not simply a matter of the demands placed on local state
regulation by national government, business or pressures from upper and middle-
class residents. Moreover, they suggest the apparent contradiction between a pro-
growth and a pro-green urban governance agenda may be illusory. Their focus is on
the implications of environmental challenges for the composition and strategies of
urban regimes. A sustainability perspective can provide a range of theoretical and em-
pirical insights into urban enterpreneurialism, the changing context for urban politics
and, to some extent, the social contradictions of urban environmental regulation
under a regime of ‘ecological modernization’ (While et al. 2004).
While many of the empirical findings of this work are interesting, we do not propose
an urban regime approach in this contribution, largely because the use of the
regulationist-regime metaphor still over-narrows the research perspective to a classic
and irremediable social conflict causality. Moreover, the ‘urban coalition’ model that
regime theory tends to derive from economic governance analysis is clearly
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an approach in which, for example, innovative ‘clean technology’ interests or social
movements including those of a ‘counter-cultural’ nature may be observed to have im-
pacted upon raising ‘green consciousness’ such as green politics, ‘green growth’, organic
farming and catering, green urbanism, and ‘peak oil’ analysts (Wolch 2007; Guthman
2004; Manning 2004; Kunstler 2005; Kahn 2006). To that end, as discussed in the intro-
duction above a research approach drawing upon policy network interactions within
city governance modes is preferred. This is proposed as a valid alternative conceptual
model to regime theory by Mossberger & Stoker (Mossberger & Stoker 2001) citing
Keith Basset’s economic governance research on Bristol as an exemplar (Bassett 1996).
Policy networks are informal or semi-formal organisational mechanisms involving
public and private individuals, groups, organisations and associations that interact
around specific policies and programmes. Network stability derives from establishment
of trust, reliability, reputation and customary rules to which network members adhere.
Network maintenance is secured by the access members have to resources and influ-
ence in projects. Network management, brokerage and facilitation are necessary func-
tions. Networks arise due to their low transaction costs, high learning efficiencies and
associated knowledge gains in complex and multi-dimensional governance contexts
((Cooke & Morgan 1998), 80). This chimes with Jensen & Tollin (Jensen & Tollin
2004) in their disclosure of how networks spread innovative policy knowledge in
Copenhagen’s sustainable development strategies and actions. For them, Dogma per-
forms the role of ‘environmental foreign policy’ for its member municipalities. It acts
as an umbrella for various environmental initiatives, rendering environmental policy
more efficient. They also make a key point in referring here to the complexity issue
where many networks being related to sustainable development evolve into a ‘network
of networks’ structure, formalised into a ‘project’ with envisioned actions, rules, per-
formance audits etc. as in the Dogma project, involving Copenhagen, Albertslund,
Ballerup, Fredericia and Herning. This was successful and, for example, as network the-
ory predicts, Dogma gave rise to new networks, like the ‘Copenhagen Environmental
Network’ (since renamed Key2Green) involving the city and private entrepreneurs. Fi-
nally, a ‘network governance’ approach is a perspective with which this author is very
familiar, albeit utilising it in a different context (Cooke 1995; Cooke 1996; Cooke 2002;
Asheim & Cooke 1998; Asheim & Cooke 1999; Cooke et al. 2007).A conceptual framework
The first step in preparing research upon ‘green governance’ and its opposite, involves mobi-
lising secondary data on sustainability strategy, action planning and achievements for all cit-
ies of interest (above 100,000 inhabitants) in a given country, to clarify their status in terms
of sustainability achievements and refine research instruments to be deployed in primary re-
search. There should be three kinds of primary research instrument. The first of these is a
survey communication delivered to one key respondent per each city (e.g. 66 chief environ-
mental officers) inquiring, first, who else should be included on the project database cover-
ing the spectrum of politicians and other senior officers internal to the council significantly
or mainly involved in city sustainability governance. These should be confined to those re-
sponsible and relevant (including purchasing and outsourcing officers) for the four
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greenhouse gases. Within municipal jurisdiction these are, it will be recalled, food consump-
tion, passenger transport, energy use and municipal waste. Second, this survey inquires
about key external ‘network governance’ partners in the three other spheres identified in the
introduction to this proposal: involving, associative governance (active climate-change
lobbying by civic societies), knowledgeable governance (e.g. interfaces between city policy
and specialist research or advocacy institutions), business context (local presence of, for
example, ‘cleantech’ business; influential and demanding ‘green’ corporate citizens).
Having gathered the population of sustainability-relevant actors, a second and more
elaborate survey should be administered to an average of ten of these respondents per
city, assuming an approximate 4:6 internal/external split, i.e. a 100 % sample of some
660 survey respondents. Where, as reported by Jensen & Tollin (Jensen & Tollin 2004),
a city might have over 50 Local Agenda 21 neighbourhoods, the peak not grassroots
networks would be sampled. A variety of electronic follow-up measures should be uti-
lised to achieve a scientifically valid response rate. The logic behind surveying munici-
pal respondents and relevant network members should begin by inquiring about
implemented Agenda 21 planning and actions, followed by possible next steps such as
cities commissioning or conducting ‘ecological footprint’ or any other type of emissions
analysis (ecological life cycle analysis, for example), with follow-up actions and achieve-
ments, compliance with new advisory frameworks or regulations, and results of that,
and so on. Questionnaires should be drawn to explore items broadly indicated below:
 Policymakers: Sustainability policy history; Policy development process; Policy
learning, monitoring, reformulation; Benchmarking, networking locally and
overseas; Policy representation, engagement with community; Cross-functional
policy interaction; Multi-level policy interaction, co-ordination, disconnections;
Marketing; Policy success; Uptake of policy instruments; Policy weaknesses,
barriers, problems; Future policy ideas, visions, measures,
 Officers: Personal history regarding sustainability activity and interest; ‘environmental
footprint’ or other emissions measures for city known; Perception of climate change as a
policy issue at city level; Multi-level and lateral governance engagement or representation;
Perceived significance of these; Policy learning and external network interaction;
Joined-up internal and external governance initiatives focused on climate change issues,
 Transnational Networks: Initiatives taken to facilitate or animate sustainability
forums, conferences etc. Attendance at external and overseas interaction events;
Leadership roles in transnational sustainability networks; Perception of value of
these; Organisation and involvement in foreign study visits to observe good
practice; Learning gains or losses from engagement in transnational networks and
visits; Attendance at relevant conferences, trade fairs and exhibitions for related to
climate change, food quality, health, cleantech, recycling, waste management and
energy sustainability home and abroad
 Civic Leaders: Values, norms, conventions; Leadership; Envisioning; Monitoring of
action results; Learning processes; Benchmarking elsewhere, including overseas;
Reputation, trust in communities; Business climate; Evaluation of status quo; Policy
quality; Skills availability; Infrastructures; Weaknesses and barriers to progress;
Future requirements and political, business or associative expectations
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condition/benchmarking/emissions modelling; Engagement with city governance
network ‘platform’; advisory role on sustainable cities; research conducted for
home-base and other cities on sustainability; Evaluations or assessments of
‘ecological footprint’; Appropriateness of policies; Satisfaction with city receptivity
to expressed climate change concerns; Transport emissions quality; Constructive
criticisms; Benchmarking elsewhere, including overseas.
 Entrepreneurs & Corporates: Entrepreneurial history; Skills profile; Locational
rationale; Business performance; Markets (Domestic-Foreign; Customer status),
E-business; Associations; Networks; Valuable interactions (Local, Regional, National,
Global); Innovative/Creative visions, solutions; Infrastructure quality; Policy
relevance; Policy adoption; Barriers to growth; Future expectations
Despite the theoretical preference for a policy networks over a regime approach
to this research, there is interest, dimensionally, in two concepts that are noted in
Mossberger & Stoker (Mossberger & Stoker 2001) arising from urban regime re-
search, ‘modes of governance’ ((DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999), 244–5) and ‘sym-
bolic regime’ (Stone 1989) or preferably in this case ‘symbolic governance’ which is
true to its original connotation in Stone (Stone 1989) of ‘ideology or image’ when
cities are bent on changing these, for example, towards ‘green governance.’ Accord-
ingly, the pre-research typology framework, to guide the research design and results
analytically, differentiates cities that have both a high sustainability profile and action
outcomes, from those with high profile but low action, and those scoring low on both
(x-axis) (Fig. 1).
Finally, the third primary research module of the project would be a series of face
to face interviews with an illustrative sample of the surveyed cities and their govern-
ance networks based on the Fig. 1 taxonomy outcome. Some forty-five interviews
(five per city; 2:3 ratio internal:external to municipality) might be envisaged on the
assumption that each taxonomy box in Fig. 1 will observe at least one entry. They
should explore more deeply and with a semi-structured interview guide, matters of
particular theoretical, analytical and policy interest to this research. Unexpected or
inadequately articulated responses to survey questioning should be clarified. A con-
siderable effort should be made to gain understanding for and the appropriateness
of the allocation of cities to the nine categories. If reasons for modification arise,
adjustments will be justified at this time. This part of the research may adopt the
‘critical friend’ interviewing approach pioneered by Charles Sabel (e.g. (Cooke 1995)),
where observed performance is judiciously ‘talked down’ to elicit the full attention
of the usually elite interview respondent. We also proposed to visit Copenhagen and
Malmö for purposes of interviewing key personnel as a ‘learning, monitoring and
feedback exercise also involving sharing our results with them in discussions and
presentations. These should involve, returning to Fig. 1, profiling where, on the y-
axis cities are also entered in the post-research taxonomy according to their ‘govern-
ance mode’ contrasting well-networked and responsive to network interests, with
weaker, responsive networking governance but proactive government, and a low net-
working propensity government category that reacts to governance and is accord-
ingly exclusive regarding government. These alignments should thus, in principle,
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interview sample is to be drawn. Variable weightings of content areas in relation to
emissions contributions should be considered, and extent of network governance
practice and quality of outcomes will be determinate in rankings.Conditions for climate change improvement in CEE
In this section and in the space available we have time to consider two key variables that
act as key conditions consistent with action to mitigate climate change problems in CEE
cities, regions and national governments. The first of these is the extent to which the pos-
ition regarding for example climate change causing global warming emissions are signifi-
cantly worse than those of, for example, partner countries in the EU or future ones in
OECD, for example, as cases in point. Another key variable is the quality of human capital
in CEE countries that may be mobilised both to recognise any problematic characteristics
scientifically and in to respond robustly to such a situation in policy terms.
Regarding the first issue, it may be clearly seen (Figs. 2 and 3) that energy efficiency
is far worse in the three CEE blocs of EU, Balkans and Russian Federation than in EU
(15) or OECD (Europe) or OECD (World).
Thus we see a marked difference in the levels of energy intensity utilised in the CEE
countries compared to EU 15 and OECD countries. As can be seen from Fig. 4 (below),
Denmark has the lowest energy intensity of all the 2003 European Union member states,
some of those being Accession (i.e. former CEE) countries, which all show up with high
energy intensity compared to the older EU member states. This is of course in line with
our discussion in the Introduction of measures that have been taken even at city and local
level in Denmark that contribute significantly to the reduction in energy use, wastage andFig. 2 Energy efficiency in the Central and Eastern European blocs
Fig. 3 Causes of high energy intensity in CEE & neighbouring blocs
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mising its overall contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, notably CO2, NOX and
Methane, the worst causes of global warming and consequent climate change.Profile of country commitment to moderating climate change: Denmark
Denmark is a benchmark for the whole developed world in terms of its commitment to
moderating its, albeit small, overall contribution to global warming. It is important to
understand the role of democratic and informal (protest) politics in bringing aboutFig. 4 Energy intensity within the European Union
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clean energy, clean water and clean production methodologies from the early 1970s.
This was when the first wave of serious popular concern about the environmental dam-
age caused by economic growth occurring in Western countries. A series of social
movements protested in the streets about the Danish government’s nuclear energy plan.
It was successful and caused the government to change to renewable energy strategy,
including decommissioning its nuclear energy research institute Risø at Roskilde, near
Copenhagen. This institute was charged with conducting research in other areas than
nuclear energy, among which evolved renewable energy and issues relating to the
‘greening’ of Denmark. As will be indicated below, this led to the early development of
clusters of renewable energy innovation, particularly around wind turbine and solar
thermal equipment manufacture. By 2006 40 % of Denmark’s total energy needs were
met by renewable energy, half of which derived from the by now enormous sea wind
power farms that have been constructed offshore in Danish waters.
The impact of this is captured in data from the European Commission that shows
Denmark as a whole being one of the Clean Technology leaders. Thus in 2007, accord-
ing to the European Commission:
‘….environmental technology is one of Denmark’s largest business clusters, and
includes 420 companies (60,000 employees)…..analysis showed a number of
‘strongholds’ for potential to develop new environmental technologies clusters. They
include offshore turbines and water purification.’ (European Commission 2007)
The Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (FORA) report shows that a
further 46 knowledge institutions consider themselves to be primarily active in environ-
mental technology research. The FORA report shows one means by which the emer-
gence of ‘green innovation’ clusters may be performed partly at the behest of government
activity. This is referred to elsewhere as ‘articulation of discourse’ (Davenport & Leitch
2008). This is a powerful cognitive and ideological process by means of which a discourse
of action and promotion occurs within the state apparatus but articulated both to wider,
global concerns, the interests and concerns of local business, and a modernising dis-
course expressing a policy-advisory consensus, in this case privileging clusters, innovation
and climate change. For illustrative purposes, clearly, upon inspection, the quote from the
European Commission (European Commission 2007) report is taken directly from the
FORA report. This report shows how the FORA business and economic research unit
defined environmental businesses and mapped a Danish cluster. This cluster occupies the
abstract space of Denmark’s national environmental industry. It is the loosest definition of
‘clustering’ as promulgated by Porter (Porter 1990). Hence apart from being in Denmark
the ‘cluster’ has no geographical specificity of the kind Porter (Porter 1998) was rather
more sensitive towards. He referred there to a cluster as:
‘… a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated
institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalties and complementarities’
With regard to such clusters the most important analytical task is to establish the ex-
tent of interconnections, commonalities and complementarities since this is what
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exploiting knowledge spillovers for competitive advantage.
In the FORA exercise, the first step was, as indicated, to identify the ‘clump’ of envir-
onmental technology firms throughout Denmark prior to articulating, somewhat assert-
ively, that they constitute a cluster. Next, the ‘cluster’ is divided into sub-clusters based
on the environmental challenge faced by the company or knowledge institution, i.e.
into which sub-category of the abstracted cluster do specific actors ‘fit’? Eight of these
were identified. Next a pilot project was run examining three of these sub-clusters –
energy/climate change, water and chemicals. The rationale for selecting these first for
further analysis was scale (‘three sizeable clusters’), including high-tech smaller and
large Danish companies, and areas in which Danish research institutes are perceived to
be conducting world-class R&D. The two target groups, firms and research institutes
were then invited to profile their extent of ‘green innovation’, market expectations of
their chosen course of action, and extent of collaboration (key to clustering) with others
in this pursuit. Next, these answers were assessed in relation to sub-cluster critical mass
(unspecified), knowledge (world class or not), and market potential (preferably global).
Hence, to repeat, the articulated discourse of what have now become Denmark’s envir-
onmental technology clusters draws on global excellence, innovativeness, collaboration
and scale. Interestingly, photovoltaics, another pronounced cluster in north Jutland is
not highlighted in this report (Cooke 2011).
Therefore on this basis five promising clusters were selected:
 Wind energy turbines (pioneered in Denmark since the 1970s, see below)
 Water purification (well-established businesses)
 Industrial biotechnology (well established, e.g. fermentation, enzymes)
 Biofuels (spin-offs from existing industry, for development)
 Fuel cells (spin-offs from existing industry, for development)
Companies in such industries were then asked what frame conditions (i.e. govern-
ment support) would help them to evolve their potential or actual ‘stronghold’ status.
These included regulation, stimulus to collaboration, public research funding and
entrepreneurship. In the Appendix reporting contacts with research institutes only
some 10 % of these seem to have occurred outside Copenhagen, indicating the official
‘cluster’ discourse probably has a geography (and a ‘scale’ bias), which is centred upon
the capital city even though substantial economic activity takes place in Jutland and
elsewhere. This interpretation is supported in respect of the location of business inter-
viewees, where larger Jutland firms like Vestas and Siemens Wind Power (wind tur-
bines), Grundfos and Danfoss (both engineering) feature more strongly among the
environmental technology interlocutors.
Nevertheless, focusing momentarily on wind energy, the question of whether what is
in North Jutland is a wind-turbine cluster has to be addressed. On this, Andersen et al.
(Andersen et al. 2006) point to the wind energy industry having passed through an
early phase characterised by numerous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
producing domestically-scaled wind power for individual farms and householders. But
latterly, especially since the government subsidy to producers was removed in 2000, the
scale of equipment has increased tenfold and sea power from large-scale offshore wind
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ancy, most early wind turbines in rural Denmark will soon disappear if they have not
already done so. So the current industry structure is large Danish (Vestas) or foreign
(Siemens) producers and a supply platform of SMEs. There may be less local sourcing
of key equipment like gearboxes than in the early days when North Jutland shipbuilding
firms could adapt to meet the nascent wind energy demand. However, the scale and
adaptability of German heavy engineering in cranes and related equipment means they
now supply the Danish wind energy input market. Services and special logistics firms,
the latter capable of transporting the now typically massive fibreglass turbine blades
also exist in proximity as do a great many components suppliers.Biofuels from agro-food research in Wales
Finally, as an indicator that relatively high and clean technology outcomes can arise
from research in what is not normally considered a high technology industry, namely
agriculture, we turn to recent developments that will have a major contribution to the
moderation of global warming from high fossil fuel energy intensity by replacing it with
agriculturally-derived Biofuel. Decades of research at the world-leading Institute of
Grassland and Environmental Research (IGER) at Plas Gogerddan on the Cambrian Coast
a few miles north of Aberystwyth have been devoted to the apparently prosaic aim of im-
proving cattle and sheep fodder. After lengthy experimentation and some false moves in
the knowledge exploration and exploitation processes, IGER in the 1980s came up with a
global winner in fodder technology. This is a cross-bred rye grass product, the original
variant of which was named AberDart. IGER patented this ryegrass because it is no ordin-
ary grass. It is, indeed a supergrass, otherwise known as SugarGrass. It earns a royalty of
£100,000 per year from seed merchants throughout the UK.
Whence SugarGrass? IGER bioscientists wanted to understand how to increase yield
and quality of meat raised on Welsh grasses. This took them inside the rumen of these
ruminants. It was discovered that enzymes that break down fodder inside the animals’
stomachs consumed a substantial proportion of its energy value in the process. This de-
prived the animals of precious protein and explained why, although the meat might be
sweeter from the clovers, thyme and other mountain herbs consumed, it remained lean
not to say meagre. The innovative insight was to recognise the need for sugar-suffused
cross-bred grass that would satisfy the enzymes yet leave plenty of extra protein for the
beef and lamb to augment and improve the nutritional and flavourful protein in the
meat. AberDart and its Aber-successors now take 50 % of the UK ryegrass seed market,
the products being marketed through Germinal Holdings.
Other brainwaves for the future will arise from research currently being conducted
into the utilisation of yellow lupins as possible super-fodder, returning nitrogen to the
soil as their seeds are turned into cake for cows and sheep, the rediscovery of kale as a
general, improved cattle food, and a chemical fertilizer-free soil improvement regime
based on utilisation of organic manuring, suitably modernised. These are all good news
for the future of a low pollution agriculture with cleaner water, air and soil as import-
ant by-products.
But this is merely the beginning of the SugarGrass story. For, some eight years ago it
was realised in tests that SugarGrass had twice the calorific value of sugar cane, the
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interview, IGER had begun to evolve a second string to its grassland expertise by devel-
oping a renewables research division. One of the biofuel feedstocks in which it became
supreme was the growing and processing of high calorific Miscanthus, more popularly
known as Elephant Grass, an African tall grass that grows on marginal land. Accord-
ingly it doesn’t compete for land with food crops, one of the criticisms of the US and
Europe’s ‘bolt for biofuels’. This has seen the ears and cobs of wheat and corn being
turned into ethanol because it’s there and subsidised, causing up to 40 % increases in
the price of such cereals, and grief in developing country food markets.
When asked who the competitors for IGER are in this specific bioenergy sub-field,
IGER’s biofuels head eventually came up with ‘maybe Berkeley, now they have the BP
endowment’. This refers to BP’s $500 million funding of a climate change research
centre not, it seems, in the leading but the more glamorous grove of academe. He also
mentioned the University of Illinois, but that was it – IGER has a current lead on both
of them. But in any case, SugarGrass is also twice as calorific as Miscanthus and IGER
favours this technology as the best long-term bet to replace oil.
So much so that the results of a key meeting with Welsh Government officials about
the prospects of funds to help build an experimental biorefinery were said to be prom-
ising. Thinking had gone as far as to speculate that when oil ceases to be refined at the
huge Milford Haven refineries in neighbouring Pembrokeshire, the pool of talent and
infrastructural sunk costs would make them ideal candidates for becoming SugarGrass
(and Miscanthus) biorefineries. These would continue to meet a huge share of the UK’s
future energy demand without greenhouse gases.
Hence economic development for an agricultural industry that has been hard-hit
by food scares and a desperate need for farm-based diversification in rural Wales
is also a consideration in this bioenergy research perspective. But it is not simply a
spinout-venture capital model that is in mind. True to the traditions of co-
operation among Welsh mountain farmers, there is a new vision of mixed farming
whereby groups of farmers grow Miscanthus on their poorest soil, devote some
fields for SugarGrass fuel cropping and raise quality Welsh Lamb or Welsh Black
Beef on their best SugarGrass land.
Precision farming, whereby seed is automatically sown in varying intensities accord-
ing to GPS field data on variability in soil humidity and fertility, held in the laptop in
the farmer’s tractor cab, makes for enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in this increas-
ingly high-tech farming model. But the prospective is that farmer co-operation would
enable them to undertake local, small-scale biorefining. SugarGrass is fermentable for
extracting the juice that becomes ethanol to be used on farm or sold. But the dried
remnants can also be used either as fodder or as feedstock for yet another bioenergy
variant, biomass power station burning.
A bio-revolution seems to be afoot in rural Wales, as not only biofuels but bio-
composites are also being researched and experimentally produced among groups of
entrepreneurial farmers linked to Bangor University in north Wales. Mercedes cars use
hemp-based insulation material of the kind being produced by an eight-farm group in
Snowdonia and ‘Future Farmers of Wales’, a 140-strong association of younger farmers
willing to diversify into biofuels, functional foods and cosmeceuticals (organic make-up) is
thriving (Cooke 2011).
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country of the UK as recent evidence shows (Table 1). This puts Wales near the top of
the UK’s GHG emissions index per capita, largely because of its history of coal produc-
tion and steel manufacture in a few locations around the south and north Wales coasts.
Thus the coal-burning Aberthaw, Deeside and Uskmouth power stations are major pol-
luters despite efforts at implanting ‘end of pipe’ emissions controlling equipment, as
are the oil refineries and cement works alongside the large Margam steelworks at Port
Talbot. Clearly, over time and preferably quite rapidly this situation will have to be
remedied in ways watched no doubt closely by the bigger polluting nations that are
now committed to EU GHG reductions of 20 % by 2020. Simultaneously, investment
has been announced to take place for large scale non-CO2 emitting power generation
facilities in various locations around Wales, burning bioethanol, wood pellets, exploit-
ing tidal barrage power and wind energy. Hence, the expectation might be that renew-
able energy sources will come on stream in time to replace demand from what, it
would further be hoped, would be a cleaner conventional energy industry that today, in
Wales as in EU Accession countries and CEE blocs discussed above. By looking closely
at what Denmark as a small sovereign country and Wales, a country within a larger
sovereign state have done and will do, CEE countries can learn and implement their
own strategies for helping save the planet from irreversible climate change caused by
global warming contributed to by such greenhouse gases as those listed in Table 1.Conclusions
We devoted this space to the subject of ‘green governance’ showing how some coun-
tries and municipalities have taken seriously their obligations under the Kyoto,
Montreal Bali and in 2009 Copenhagen climate change protocols, while many others
have not. It was shown what kind of activities can be successfully undertaken to moder-
ate emissions in cities, notably Copenhagen in Denmark and Malmö in Sweden, both
recognising that cities is where most citizens live and that much can be done to reduce
emissions from energy consumption, through recycling and by ‘clean’ transport and
environmental policies. It was subsequently shown how much GHG pollution is con-
tributed to the earth’s atmosphere by CEE compared to older EU member countries
and argued that attention must swiftly be devoted by the governance systems at state
and municipal levels in CEE to reduce these.Table 1 Top greenhouse gas polluters in Wales
CO2 (million tonnes) NO2 (tonnes)
1. RWE Npower, Aberthaw Power Station, 7.4 1. RWE, 28,325
2. Tata-Corus Steel, Port Talbot, 6.8 2. Tata-Corus, 5,672
3. E.On Deeside Power Station, 3.2 3. Chevron, 3,070
4. Chevron Oil Refinery, Milford Haven, 2.3 4. Total, 2,238
5. NPower Cogen, Barry, 1.7 5. Uskmouth, 2,009
6. Total Oil Refinery, Milford Haven, 1.2 6. E.On, 1,410
7. Baglan Operations, Neath, 1.2 7. Castle Cement, 964
8. Uskmouth Power Station, Newport, 0.9 8. Blue Circle Cement, 801
Source: Environment Agency Pollution Inventory Data
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being undertaken in the world’s leading ‘green economy’ of Denmark but also in a part
of the UK, namely Wales, that has some greater similarities to the heavy industry legacy
of CEE. In Wales, a latecomer compared to Denmark, regarding emissions controls it
was shown that even relatively humble crops like grass for cattle feed can, when im-
proved through research and innovation, make a globally valuable source of bioethanol
and biomass energy generation. It is incumbent on CEE countries to observe and apply
these types of cellulosic sources of alternative, renewable energy as their fossil-fuel
burning power stations inevitably decline unless they are appropriately modernised in
line with new, exacting EU emissions targets. This can act as a lighthouse pointing the
way for the CEE blocs that are not constrained by EU conventions but will nevertheless
be made aware of their climatic obligations by the new, tougher constraints that will
arise following the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit. The time for action has nearly
passed, with some commentators saying we need immediate massive reductions in CO2
if global warming is to be steadied let alone reversed. A ‘green’ consciousness among
the populace, comparable to the Danish protests that overturned government commit-
ment to nuclear energy, is needed to achieve the result of truly ‘green governance’ in
CEE as well as EU and OECD countries.
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